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Summary findings
Freund and Wallich examine the welfare effects of  energy subsidies that provide across-the-board relief to
increasing household energy prices in Poland. Their main  all consumers.
finding is that the policy of subsidizing household energy  But if governments want to provide some relief for
prices, common in the transition economies of Eastern  consumers to ease the adjustment, several options are
Europe and the former Soviet Union, is regressive.  available: in-kind transfers to the poor, vouchers, cash
Such programs do help the poor by providing them  transfers, and lifeline pricing for a small block of
witlh  lower-cost energy, but they are more useful to the  electricity combined with significant price increases.
rich, who consume more energy.  Simulations show that if raising prices to efficient
What is surprising is the extent to which Poland's  levels for all consumers is not now politically feasible, it
nonpoor  have benefited from lower energy prices. Not  may be socially  better  to use  lifeline  pricing  and  a large
only do the wealthy consume more energy in absolute  price increase rather than an overall (but smaller) price
terms than the poor, but they also spend a larger portion  increase.  Lifeline pricing for electricity in combination
of their income on energy.  with an 80-percent price increase has better
'T'heir analysis allowed Freund and Wallich to rule out  distributional effects than a 50-percent across-the-board
the oft-used social welfare argument for delaying  price increase.
increases in household energy prices, but they do not try  Ideally, the public utility would be compensated from
to recommend a dynamically efficient pricing path.  the budget for any reduced-price sales, rather than
The first-best response would be to raise energy prices  having to finance them through  internal cross-subsidies.
while targeting cash relief to the poor through a social  In-kind transfers to poor  households are also effective in
assistance program. This is far more efficient than the  terms of efficiency, but may be harder to administer in
present go-slow price adjustment policies, which imply  some countries than lifeline pricing.
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Raising Household Energy Prices in Poland: Who Gains? Who Loses?
Caroline Freund and Christine Wallich
Introduction
A legacy of the social contract under central planning, many forms of energy  in the
transition  economies today are still supplied to households at well below their costs.  Raising
prices to economically efficient prices is therefore a priority.  More appropriate prices are
needed to create more efficient consumption patterns and to improve the financial viability of
energy-sector  companies.  But, raising household energy prices has not been easy in most
countries that have tried it, and will not be easy in Poland, either.  This paper seeks to
determine the gainers and losers from such a price adjustment by estimating the welfare cost
to households in different  income groups of increasing household energy prices to efficient
levels.
Several characteristics distinguish energy consumption in Poland and other transition
socialist economies from energy consumption in market economies,  which have a bearing on
how raising prices will affect welfare.  First,  the residential sector consumes a large share --
30 percent  -- of total final energy. This is in part due to households'  heavy dependence on
energy for heating,  lighting, as well as other consumption activities, especially as compared
to the developing countries.  Second, the extent of price controls and production subsidies
that prevailed under  the former regime,  many of which continue to distort the economy,
makes for a qualitative difference as compared to the underpricing of energy that can also be
found in industrial and developing market economies.  Third,  middle and high income
consumers  spend a larger share of their budget on energy than low income consumers.
The first  feature tells us that energy consumption in the residential sector is a
significant portion of total energy consumption; thus price changes in this sector should have5
real effects on production as well as consumption. The second feature implies that the price
changes that may be ultimately needed will not be marginal. The third point implies that high
income families are benefitting the most from price controls.  Increasing energy prices in the
residential sector would, therefore,  reduce the "leakages" implied by this form of "social
assistance" while also providing a greater incentive to conserve energy.
The purpose of this paper is to provide some empirical evidence relating to the
interaction between pricing policy in the energy sector and social welfare.  Section 1 describes
the "stylized facts" with respect to past approaches to pricing household energy in the
transition economies; some of the changes that have been introduced since the inception of
the transition in 1989; and the attempts that have been made in Poland and other transition
economies to raise prices.  Section 2 focusses on the characteristics of energy consumption in
Poland and, using the GUS (State Statistical Bureau) household budget survey,  calculates
what portion of households'  budget is absorbed by energy outlays for various socio-economic
groups and at various income levels.  Section 3 simulates the welfare losses and the actual
income losses to different segments of the population from raising household energy prices.
Section 4 examines the interaction of price policy and social policy, asking whether, and
how, the impact of higher energy prices on the poor can be mitigated by a mixture of lifeline
rates, cash subsidies for households or other methods such as in-kind transfers.  Section 5
simulates the effects of lifeline pricing on household welfare adjustments.
I. Social Pricing Policy in the Transition Economies
Governments in the command economies used fixed low prices and wage controls as
essential elements of their distributional tool-kit.  Health services and education were free.
As a part of the social contract, governments also provided many private goods, including
subsidized dwellings, many urban services,  transport, utilities, and sometimes food, at very
low prices.  In general, these attempts to remedy fundamental (or perceived) distributional
problems through inefficient pricing of scarce resources has resulted in unsatisfactory6
improvement in income distribution while paying a high cost in efficiency terms.2 Price
controls may be a workable tool for redistribution -- but only if low income households
consume more of the low-priced good.  However,  evidence of high income elasticities for
many typically subsidized energy products in developing countries 3 suggest that price controls
may actually be more regressive (Pindyck, pp 250).  Evidence on income elasticities for
energy in transition economies in generally is not available, but our work on Poland suggests
that in Poland,  income elasticities are even higher (about 1.6) than in the developing
countries  (section III).
Energy price adjustments in central European countries
As part of their stabilization and adjustment programs,  transition economies are now
being urged to correct  public sector prices and to use national fiscal policies and targeted
allowances and subsidies to achieve their distributional aims. Continuing with past pricing
policies which made subsidies available to all implies significant leakages to the non-poor and
represents a major fiscal cost.  Nonetheless, public sector pricing is one of the last areas to
be reformed  in most of the transition countries.  Price reforms  have liberalized the prices of
most goods in the private sector, and in particular,  much progress has been made in adjusting
prices of tradeable energy (Gray 1995).  For example, oil, oil products,  and hard coal 4
energy sources are tradeable products whose prices have for the most part been liberalized.
However,  adjusting prices for public services, especially for private goods provided by the
public sector such as electricity, heat, housing rents,  water, heating, and transport  fares,  has
been more difficult.5 In the domestic energy sectors in particular,  such as electricity,  gas,
2/ For a review  of the literature  on this subject  in developing  countries,  see Bird and Miller (1989) and Jimenez
(1989).
3/ Income elasticities  for energy products  are higher in developing than in market economies (Pyndyck).
4/ Note exceptions  in Poland,  described below.
51 Electricity  strictly speaking is a tradable source of energy, but it tends to be treated  (and priced) domestically
without regard to international prices.7
and heat, on average,  there is still significant underpricing,  especially on the household side.
The rationale for keeping prices low
There are several reasons for governments'  reluctance to raise household energy
prices.  First  is a concern  over  the  impacts  - direct  and  second  round  --  of higher  energy
prices on the overall price level, which will be a function of the structure of the economy
and its energy intensity. 6 In addition, there is a  reluctance to raise the household prices for
fear of contributing to wage pressures and thus to inflation -- the counterpart of raising
industrial prices for fear of the impact on production costs and in turn inflation.  Ironically,
if such price subsidies are significant in budgetary cost and if the resulting deficits are
financed by money creation, then keeping prices too low may in fact be inflationary.
Sometimes the overall level of energy prices may be kept low in an  attempt to keep down
surplus revenues flowing to the utilities (Gray 1995).  Since the utilities typically have very
low debt/equity ratios (most investment was financed by the budget), higher prices quickly
translate into larger corporate cash-flows,  and, in the absence of strong corporate governance
and financial controls,  there is concern over how such additional resources  would be used by
energy enterprises,  which may be powerful and have significant autonomy.  Finally,  since
there is presently excess energy capacity in the transition economies, as pointed out by Gray,
"In most countries there is a lack of serious supply crisis  (for domestically produced power,
heat, gas and coal) and a lack of long-term enterprise debt problem.  Politicians are not
motivated by a supply crisis (i.e.,  the lights aren't  going out)."  (Gray 1995, page 36).  The
excess capacity also means there is, apparently, little immediate need for foreign investment
that might supply new capacity and thus results in little "demand" for typical western pricing
policies and the regulatory framework that accompanies this.  The exception is Hungary
which has made the most progress on pricing and regulation.  Its success is due in part to a
6/ NERA (1991) estimated  that increasing  domestic  gas prices in Poland  to border prices in 1990--an  increase of
more than 600% for households  and 50% for industry--would  result in an upper bound on the increase in
inflation  of about 4%. A lower bound  on the inflationary  impact on the CPI of total energy price increases is
about 0.2 % for a I % increase  in the overall price of energy (based on energy's share of household  and
industrial  costs).8
strategy offering to attract foreign investors to buy portions of utilities for cash so as to
reduce its large fiscal dleficit and foreign debt.  Finally, there is a concern over the
presumed social impact of such price rises -- the focus of this paper.
Current pricing  approaches in transition economies
In many central European countries, even where the overall level of energy prices has
been raised, the old socialist price structure, which subsidizes the residential consumer has
been kept. As observed in Gray (1995, chapter 5), while, generally, wholesale prices cover
the utilities'  financial costs, the higher industrial price cross-subsidizes the lower household
prices.  Even where consumer prices are at or above industrial prices, as in Albania, Poland,
and Hungary,  they diverge to a greater degree from long run marginal cost than do the prices
charged industrial users.  This is the reverse of the marginal economic cost structure used in
Western countries which typically prices energy to households above the cost to industry,
inter alia, because of the higher costs of the household distribution system.  Appendix tables
i  and 2 (Gray  1995, pg. 27-28) compare prices of electricity and gas in eastern Europe and
OECD to estimates of LRMC.  A commonly advanced hypothesis for this choice of price
structure relates to the "soft budget constraint" on enterprises:  higher energy prices for
industry and the burdens such cross-subsidies might imply would be accommodated by the
fisc,  while the social contract required subsidies on the consumer side.  In the west, concerns
about international competitiveness would preclude such an approach.
In setting price levels,  instead of using LRMC,  most central European countries
adopted an average cost pricing approach under which revenues would broadly cover
financial costs (Gray 1995). Prices under this approach are generally lower than in western
Europe:  since assets are undervalued, debt in relation to equity is low, and depreciation  rates
are unrelated to the economic life of the assets, the financial "costs" (essentially operating9
cost and debt service) of the utilities will be artificially low  '.  Whether LRMC,  which
incorporates  a long-range,  forward-looking approach to calculating economic cost, represents
the appropriate benchmark for setting the overall level of prices  in the transition economies is
sometimes debated (BOX 1).  In the central European countries, uncertainties about demand
growth and future investments raise legitimate questions about the immediate applicability of
the LRMC model. That said, it may be appropriate to broaden the present approaches to the
calculation of financial costs to include more forward looking estimates of the replacement
cost of investments,  with a view to enabling utilities to finance a sufficient portion of their
future investments from internal cash generation and to pay dividends.
Recent price policies  in Poland
While energy remains underpriced in many transition economies,  all countries have
by now made progress  in bringing prices closer to financial  cost recovery levels.  In Poland,
significant effort has been made towards increasing energy prices to more efficient levels.  In
the aftermath of the transition,  in early 1990, a new pricing system for energy was
introduced.  Subsidies were to be eliminated over a four year period and the residential price
of electricity rose three-fold in 1990 and then increased sharply again in 1991. Household
prices of gas rose by somewhat less. District heat prices rose about three-fold from  1990 to
1991 (Meyers,  Schipper and Salay, 1995 forthcoming, pp. 2-3). As a result,  energy prices
moved from a low level -- in some cases as low as 5 percent of economic levels 8 pre-
transition  -- to about 80 - 90 percent of economic costs for coal 9 and about 60 percent  on
7/  See Gray,  1995 for an excellent discussion of the impact of debt-equity ratios and other factors on the level
of prices in utilities in central  Europe in relation to neighboring countries in western Europe.
8/ Economic levels approximate long run marginal costs if the necessary investments which  are needed  to meet
demand and environmental standards are included.
9! To wholesale users.  At the retail (household) level, the price of coal to households is not directly subsidized.
However, there are at least four elements of indirect subsidy: (i) preferential VAT tax rate (7% instead of the
nornal  22%); (ii) overcapacity in mining has created a surplus, which has depressed prices on the free market.
The overcapacity is artificially maintained through mine closure subsidies, which in reality are used to some
(continued...)10
Box  I - What constitutes "efficient pricing?"
Long run marginal cost pricing has sometimes been taken as the benchmark for setting prices in the energy sector.
Several characteristics of the energy sector in central Europe raise questions about the appropriateness of using LRMC
(Gray 1995). Underlying the LRMC approach is an assumption that energy demand is growing and that future investment
needs can be reliably  forecasted.  Neither is fully the case in the transition socialist economies.
Energy intensities,demandprojections and investment needs. Energy demand is hard to predict in central Europe
because there is so much room for improved efficiency in consumption. Energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of
GDP) in central Europe is three to six times that of industrial or developing economies, and in Poland it is:seven times
higher than West Gennany's  (Meyers, Schipper and Salay, 1989).  Energy consumption has declined in response to the
sharp decline in GDP in the last few years, falling 24.7% from 1990 to 1993, similar to the decline in GDP (Box Table
1).  Energy  intensity has also  declined  since  1992. In  Poland energy consumption  has declined  23.2%. since. 1990,
substantially  reducing  energy intensity. The main reason energy consumption decreased more than GDP in Poland is
because of the fall in industrial output -- industry being the most energy intensive sector.
The continued contraction of energy intensive heavy industry and ongoing improvements in energy efficiency
are expected to reduce energy intensity and further reduce growth in energy demand.  These trends mean  investment
requirements for new capacity are likely to be small.  Central Europe is thus different from other regions such as East Asia,
where power demand  is growing much faster than supply (Gray  1995. pg. 29).
Box Table  1:  Percent change  in energy consumption and GDP in transition economies
|  1990  1991  1992  1993  Total
ISE  Encrgy Consumption  -7.0  -9.0  -8.5  -2.7  -24.7
TSE GDP  -7.5  -10.0  -4.7  1.3  -21.7
Poland Energy Consumption  -19  -2  -4  0.8  -23.2
Poland GDP  -11.9  -7.6  1.5  3.8  -14.2
ources:  tor all 'ISEs: Gray 1995; for Polan  1990-1991: Meyers, Schipper, Salay (1995 forthcoming),  for Poland  992-
1993: Energy Infonnation  Center.
Environmentaland rehabilitation investment.  While central Europe may not need large new capacity investments,
investment is needed to rehabilitate existing facilities and to make energy production environmentally cleaner.  But, that
timing is uncertain, depending e.g. on demands imposed by countries importing the transition economies'  goods, and the
implementation  of stricter "European" environmental standards in TSEs (Gray,  1995).
In short. uncertainty about new capacity requirements and about when westem environmental standards will be
implemented makes it diflicult  to discem w%hat  investment costs LRMC price increases should in fact incorporate. What
is certain is that utilities need to recover costs, including some "best guess" of future  investment needs.
9/(...continued)
extent  to have  the  mines  survive  longer;  (iii)  local  retail  prices  do not  reflect  the  full  environmental  costs  of coal
production.  A  study  has estimated  environmental  costs  to represent  about  10% of  present  production  costs;
finally,  (iv)  local  prices  to households  do  not  reflect  the  environmental  costs  of  buming  coal,  as small  users  are
not subject to standards, let alone fees or fines.  Overall, the indirect subsidy on coal to retail (household) users
may not be small.I1
average for network fuels such as power,  gas, and heat as the transition took hold.  In terms
of industrial/household relativities, the structure of prices in Poland is closer to the economic
cost structure (i.e.,  LRMC) than is that of the other central European countries  (Gray 1995).
But further increases are still needed, if LRMC is taken as a benchmark (Table 2)
for the longer term and especially if it is used as a benchmark for the relative
household/industry price structure  Taking tariff levels of 1993 as an example, average
household electricity prices would need to be increased by 90 percent to reach estimated long
run marginal cost levels.  The price of household gas needed to be increased by about 80
percent.  District heat is currently the most problematic to compare,  as costs vary widely
based on location: in the first six months of 1993 prices averaged Zl 140,000 /GJ, but ranged
from ZI 60,000 to ZI 365,000 /GJ.  On average,  district heat prices needed to be increased by
about 60 percent.  (Poland:  Growth With Equity Policies For The 1990's,  p.  89).  More
generally, even if the overall level of prices is based on financial criteria  in the short run
(moving to LRMC based in long run),  the structure of prices is severely distorted.  Since
household prices should be set to reflect LRMC structure, this implies a need for very
substantial household price increases.
Table 2: Poland - Price increases  needed  to bring energy prices to economic  levels.
[Energy  Type:  District heat  Eleci ;city  Gas
Req.  price  increase*  60%  90%  80% !ource:  Poland: Growth with equity policies for the 1990's,  1994.  * Based on 1993 pi-ces.
Prices and consumption patterns
Residential use in Poland accounts for about 30 percent of total final energy use.'°
Coal has been the main source of households' primary energy in Poland for the last two
10/ See Meyers,  Schipper and Salay,  1995 forthcoming.  They find that 75-80% of use by  "other customers"  is
residential  and use by other customers accounts for 40  % of total final energy use. (pp.  1-3 and 5-2).12
decades,  though in part due to recent price increases its share is now declining (Meyers,
Schipper,  and Salay,  1995 forthcoming).  Space heating accounts for the largest share of
residential energy expenditures,  in the form of coal, district heat, wood, and some electricity.
This makes energy socially and politically important in the European and central Asian
transition economies in a way that it is not in many other warmer climate developing
countries.  Without heat people will freeze.
Energy,'s Share in the Consumption Basket. These consumption patterns mean that
any substantial increases energy prices will have a major impact on household energy
expenditures.  Aggregate figures show that even the impact of price increases to date has
been significant.  Outlays for electricity and heat accounted for between 2.5 percent and
4.9%  of average monthly household expenditures of workers and retired persons,
respectively,  in  1985.  In 1991, the shares doubled to 5.9%  and 10 % (Meyers,  Schipper,
and Salay,  1995 forthcoming).  By 1993, the respective proportions were 8.8  % and  11.7% -
- a near tripling -- and the average energy expenditure for all households was 9.5%.  This
contrasts with the average share of energy in household budgets in western Europe of about 5
% --  although in the 1970s after the energy crisis and before demand adjustments took
place, several countries had shares around  10 % (Pyndyck 1979).  In developing countries,
the average expenditure share of energy is higher and it is not unusual for energy
expenditures  as a share of income of the poor to be over 20 percent,  even in countries where
heat is not needed (Barnes 1994).
Household Price Elasticities of Demand. How hard is it for households to adjust their
consumption to higher prices? There is little evidence of price elasticities for the transition
economies.  But a number of factors suggest that the elasticity of demand might be low in
the short term,  and certainly lower than in market economies, at least for some fuels.  For
example,  for the most part, district  heating is priced based on the square meters of apartment
area. This  implies that raising the price of district heat can have no effect on the quantity
consumed by a given household -- unless the household moves apartments. But moving will
not affect aggregate consumption of all households in the short term,  since there will be no13
change in the housing stock."  Although users may wish to reduce district heat consumption,
they cannot. The invariance of the quantity consumed to the price also means that there will
be no incentive or ability for consumers to insulate houses and engage in activities to reduce
the needed district heat quantities. Raising the price of coal on the other hand will have direct
effects on consumption. This is evident from the fall in coal consumption after the price
hikes in  1990.  For power,  the price elasticities may also be lower than in the market
economies.  Because of poor technology,  appliances in the central European countries use
much more electricity then their European counterparts.  For example about 30 percent of the
stock of TVs in Poland are old Polish-made black and white models which use more than
three times as much as models imported from OECD countries (Poland: Household Budget
Survey,  1993 and Meyers,  Schipper, and Salay, 1994). In the last 20 years more homes
have become owners of electrical appliances as well (Meyers,  Schipper and Salay,  1994).
Turning over this stock of out-dated and energy consuming appliances will take time,  and
until newer and more efficient ones replace them, one can expect price elasticities of demand
to remain lower than in market economies.
In section III, we simulate the impacts of raising energy prices for the three major
energy sources (district heat, electricity and gas) on a cross-section of household groups,
under a range of assumptions about price elasticities. Our assumed  range of price elasticities
of demand for energy is between zero and minus one.  This is based on estimates from
previous  work: Pindyck finds the long run elasticity for  "energy" as a whole to be -1.  1 in the
U.S.  and others  have found similar estimates for many European nations, ranging from -0.28
to -1.7  (Pindyck p.  118). Estimates of own-price elasticities for specificfuels  have led to
more divergent results.  Though the evidence is scant, price elasticities tend to be slightly
lower in the developing countries than in the industrialized countries (Pindyck, p.  257).  A
survey of estimates of residential demand in three developing countries finds that long run
price elasticities are slightly lower,  averaging about -0.88 (Dahl 1991 p. 46).  Both Pindyck
11/ Over the long run, expenditures  on housing  and energy  may fall: in this case there is more money to spend
on other goods and utility may increase.14
and Dahl also report higher income elasticities in the developing world than in the
industrialized nations. Estimates of price elasticity of demand for electricity are in general
lower than for all energy taken together.  In general price elasticities range from  -0.34 to -
1.2, and appear to be lower in Europe than in the U.S.(Pindyck p.  120). Wilder and
Willenborg compare their estimate to that of four other studies and found a similar range for
price elasticities of -1.0 to -1.31.
IJ. Residential Energy Consumption in Poland -- Some Empirical Evidence
The purpose of this section is to answer some of the questions raised by the features
of energy pricing and consumption patterns outlined above.  First,  who in Poland would be
hurt and by how much if household energy prices were to rise to "efficient" levels?  Second:
How effective are Poland's  present energy pricing policies at accomplishing Poland's  social
welfare goals?
Data and methodology
The data set used to carry out the empirical analysis in this section is the 1993
household budget survey. This data set consists of information on the expenditures of 16,044
Polish households surveyed between January and June 1993. Expenditure shares by income
and social group are calculated as "per equivalent adult",  based on  the OECD scale (first
adult  =  1; other adults =  0.7;  children aged under  14 =  0.5).  The survey expenditure data
has been weighted by socio-economic grouping to properly represent the composition of the
nation. Regional price differences have also been accounted for by weighting expenditures
(and income) according to a regional price index.
Total expenditures  (rather than income) are used as a basis for this analysis.  Due to
widespread under-reporting  of income in household survey instruments,  total expenditures
appear to be a better means of characterizing the well-being of the population than is
reported income.  Expenditure surveys thus also shed more light on household's  poverty15
status.  Often,  the household surveys'  reported income is biased because the survey
methodology in use in the transition economies has not yet been adapted to the new economic
structure.  For example, when income and expenditures are compared in this survey,
expenditures greatly exceed income for three hard-to-track groups: farmers,  self-employed,
and social income recipients.  These groups operate to a greater degree in the informal or
grey economy, and data are apparently less accessible to the survey gatherers - just  as they
are to the tax administration." 2
Data on energy consumption was also collected as part of the Polish household budget
survey.  There is a small caveat as to its representativeness:  The 1992/1993 winter was
slightly warmer than average (Meyers,  Schipper, and Salay, 1994) and the first six months
of the year when the survey was conducted are in general warmer than the second six
months,  so that energy expenditure may be slightly lower in this sample than overall
(Understanding Poverty in Poland).  Still, our concentration is primarily on the distribution
of energy consumption among different groups in the population, and there is no reason to
believe that this distribution  is skewed in any way.
Mo  consumes the most energy in Poland?
Consumption by income group.  The first important finding is that energy consumed a
larger portion of the budget of the non-poor than of the poor (Table 3). While the poorest 20
percent of the population spent 7.4 percent of the their total expenditures on energy,  the top
40 percent  spent more than 10 percent.  So, not only did the better off spend a larger absolute
amount on energy than the poor,  they also consumed a larger proportion of their
expenditures as energy. This suggests there is a positive and strong income elasticity of
energy demand (see below).  This is different from the pattern  in industrial market economies
where evidence suggests that long-run income elasticities are close to unity (Pindyck 1979).
12/ See Understanding  Poverty in Poland,  World Bank 1995  for a further description  of the survey.16
Table 3: Energy  as a percent  of total expenditures,  by expenditure  class
Expenditure  District  Electricity  Gas  Major  Residential  Wood  Hot  All
quintile  heat  o  energy  coal  water  energy
I  sources
1  (poorest)  i.5  [3.6  ~  1.3  17.6  ]0.4  [0.2  10.4  [7.4
2  2.2  j3.4  11.7  8.0  J0.8  [0.3  0.6  (9.0
3  2.6  ,  35  2.0  181  11.3  10.3  0.6  1102
4  t2.6  j32  12.2  o  7.3  2.1  0.2  0.6  10.8
5 (richest)  12.2  j2.7  J27  164  12.5  {o.i  0.5  [10.3
All  12.2  3.3~  11.9  j7.4  11.4  [0.2  10.5  [9.5
ource: Authors' cabulations from Poland Hous  mold  Budget Survey, 1993s  m  as  t
To get an idea of what this means in terms of actual household expenditures,  consider that
total average monthly expenditures on energy for each group are as follows: the first quintile spent
ZI  1,117,740;  the second,  ZI 1,719,450; the third, ZT  2,176,800;  the fourth,  Zi 2,782,530;  and the
fifth quintile spent on average ZI 4,729,200  per month. Overall, average monthly household
expenditures were ZI 2,517,660  per person. Taking the average annual exchange rate in 1993 of ZI
18,145,  the bottom quintile spent ZI 82,712 or about US$  4.6  on fuel while the top quintile spent
ZI 487,108  or about US$ 26.8 on energy, more than 5 times as much as the bottom quintile.
In terms of the main forms of subsidized energy (district heat, electricity and gas)
consumption patterns are distributed somewhat more similarly to income (implying that any
subsidies are only slightly regressive).  Most of the regressiveness of the energy subsidy is due to
gas (the rich consume twice as much as the poor).  The subsidy on electricity is flat, except for the
highest income group, and on district heat,  it is distributed in a u-shaped fashion.
Income elasticities. A rough guess at income elasticity can be made simply by looking at the
percentage change in energy consumption divided by the percentage change income (Table 4).  This17
rough calculation shows the income elasticity to be between 1 and 2.  Looking closely,  this result is
generated primarily by gas -- the rich consumed about twice as much  as a proportion  of their
expenditures  as the poor (2.7 percent of their budget as compared to  1.3 percent)  -- and heat
consumption -- where the fifth quintile consumed about 2.3  times more than the poorest  quintile1 3
(Table 3).  This implies that price controls in the energy sector, especially those on gas and district
heat are regressive and hence involve a lot of "leakage" of the price subsidy to the non-poor in
social welfare terms.
Table 4: Poland- Estimated Income Elasticity of Energy Demand
expenditure group  percentage change in  percentage change in  income elasticity
energy expenditures  income
I to 2  0.73  0.46  1.60
2 to 3  0.44  0.27  1.65
3 to 4  0.35  0.27  1.26
4 to 5  0.51  0.70  0.73
Source: Authors' calculation .rom Poland Household Budget Survey, 1993.
Consumption by socio-economic group.  The second main finding comes from examining
energy budget shares for different social welfare groups (Table 5). There are notable differences  in
energy expenditures among different socioeconomic groups. Pensioners spent a significantly larger
share of expenditures on energy (11.7%)  than any other group. This is consistent with the stylized
fact that in transition economies,  pensioners tend to be  "house rich and income poor",  especially in
urban  areas. Heating and lighting their relatively large apartments and houses thus places a greater
burden on them (8.8%  of total expenditures) than on other groups (6.9%  for all groups taken
together).  Also evident is the different types of energy each segment of the population uses.
Farmers  and mixed families use coal and wood for heating more than other groups. This is a
13/ "Heat consumption" is comprised of both district heat (Table 3 col.  1) and residential coal use (Table 3 col.
4).  As shown in table 3,  the lowest quintile spends 1.9 percent  of its budget on heat, while the richest quintile
spends 4.7  percent  of its budget.18
significant finding because  while the price of coal is hardly regulated, district heating is still highly
subsidized to consumers (Meyers, Schipper and Salay, 1994, p. 2-3; World Bank 1994).  This
implies that workers, pensioners, self-employed  and social transfer recipients  are benefitting much
more from energy price controls than are other groups such as farmers or mixed households  (Table
5).  All groups but farmers and mixed households  spend about 8% of their income on subsidized
items proportionately,  (and, by implication,  receive that much, in terms of subsidy). Farmers and
workers spend only 4% of their income. Subsidization  of self-employed  is particularly  high, since
their income is higher than other groups and they spend almost as much as pensioners, the top-
spending  group.  There are clearly also regional  effects since urban areas use district heating while
rural areas are more dependent  on coal and wood. In sum, the subsidies  benefit urban households.
Table 5:  Energy  expenditure  as a percentage  of total expenditure  by social welfare group
Social Welfare  Heat  Electricity  Gas  Major  Coal  Wood  Hot  All
Group  energy  water  energy'
sources
Worker  2.7  3.0  1.9  7.6  0.5  0.1  0.8  8.8
Farmer  3.2  0.7  3.9  2.2  0.6  6.7
Mixed  2.9  1.2  4.1  2.0  0.4  6.4
Pensioner  2.5  3.7  2.2  8.4  2.6  0.3  0.4  11.7
Self-employed  2.1  3.4  2.5  7.7  0.3  0.6  8.9
Soc. Recipient  2.1  4.0  1.7  7.8  0.5  0.3  0.5  9.0
All  2.2  3.3  1.9  7.4  1 4  0.2  0.5  9.5
a/ May  not sum due  to rounding.  Note:  Spent  less  than  D.05%  of budget.
Source: Household budget survey.
While farmers and mixed households  consumed  much less district heat than most households,
they also used more wood than the others. Interestingly, a large portion of the wood consumed  was
actually free; of the wood consumed  by farmers and mixed households  about two-thirds of it was
free. Meyers, Shipper and Salay (1995 forthcoming)  found that when the price of coal rose in 1990,19
coal consumption  dropped significantly,  there was evidence that people  consumed  coal stored from
the previous  year and also switched  to wood consumption.
Consumption  Patterns  by Employment  Status. There are no significant  differences  between
the long-term  unemployed  and the not long-term  unemployed  in terms of energy consumption  (Table
6).  Their consumption  is broadly  the same as the population  at large taken-  together -- 9.5% of
expenditures. Consumption  of subsidized  energy is slightly  higher among the long term unemployed
(7.6% vs 7.4% of spending).
Table 6: Poland - Energy  as a percentage  of total expenditure  by employment  class
Employment  Heat  Electricity  Gas  Major energy  All
category  sources  energy
Long term  2.0  3.7  1.9  7.6  9.2
Unemployed'
Not-long term  2.2  3.3  1.9  7.4  9.5
Unemployed
a/ Defined as households with one or more members who have been unemployed for more than one year.
Source:  Poland Household Budget Survey.
Special  problems in raising  household  energy  prices in transition  economies
Income decline  and  fixed incomes. There are unique problems  in the former socialist
economies  in adjusting  household  energy prices. First, incomes have fallen over the transition -- in
some countries  by 30 percent or more since 1989  - and poverty has increased (Milanovic, 1996
forthcoming). Where the poverty incidence  used to be 2-4 percent before the transition it is now
upwards of 15 percent.  Unemployment  levels are at historically  high levels and in some countries
five times higher than in the pre-transition  period, and a larger fraction of the population  than in the
market economies  are on fixed incomes (and hence vulnerable  to inflation),  judging by the higher
system dependency  rates of their social security pension  systems.  Indeed, in Poland, some 22
percent of the Polish population,  and fully 49 percent of the labor force receive (fixed) pensions,20
while in the United States the equivalent figures are 16 percent and 32 percent.
Non-marginal price increases.  Second and perhaps more important, prices often have to be
increased substantially -- by a multiple of the controlled price rather than by only a small
percentage.  These factors alone would make raising prices politically challenging. But there are
further complications.  First,  it is often not just  the price of one energy source or utility that needs
adjusting,  but many public sector prices -- transport, rents,  power,  gas, water, heat.  Jointly,  these
can add up to a significant proportion of household incomes, and there would be major income
effects if the price increases were to take place simultaneously. Rent increases are likely to be
especially burdensome, since housing is generally thought to be highly underpriced  (Renaud). In
addition,  the still relatively large share of non-cash earnings in workers'  total compensation package
in some  countries  --  most  notably  enterprise-provided  housing  and  social  services'4 -- means
households have less truly disposable income than in market economies.  While some countries have
moved in the direction of charging for social services, the high payroll taxes used to fund them also
reduce the discretionary spending envelope available for necessities,  as compared to market
economies,  so that increases in energy/utility prices are keenly felt, since they reduce this small
discretionary envelope even further. And, third,  the socialist legacy has left people with a feeling of
entitlement to free or subsidized goods.
A rapid adjustment of household energy and utility prices -- especially if combined with increases in
other public sector prices,  such as rent and transport --  would imply significant changes in the cost
of living and in welfare (Table 7).  Thus, changing public sector prices will likely result in large
and unpopular distributional shifts if not properly managed.  Such shifts could upset the fragile
democracies  that are emerging in the transition  countries.  As shown in Table 7, utilities in the
energy sector absorbed almost 10 percent of total household expenditures  in Poland in 1993.  If
transport and communication are included this total reaches about 16 percent of household
14/ There is some data in the Household Budget Survey on the non-cash component of compensation but it is not
reliable because, inter alia, pricing non-cash items is difficult.  What has been reported is in the range of 5% - 10%
but it is probably an underestimate since  many households did not respond on this item.21
expenditures.  Including  rents  -- even  at their  generally  low levels  -- brings  the  total  up  to  18.2%.'5
Table 7: Poland - Transport, communication, and rent as percent of total expenditures
quintile  total energy  transport  and  rent  total utilities
communication  transport  and rent
I  (poorest)  7.4  4.3  2.2  13.9
2  9.0  5.1  2.6  16.7
3  10.2  5.9  2.7  18.8
4  10.8  6.7  2.6  20.1
5  (richest)  10.3  9.0  2.2  21.5
All  9.5  6.2  2.5  18.2
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from  Poland Household  Budget Survey.
III.  Raising Energy Prices: Who Loses and by How Much?
There are three types of effects on households associated with higher household energy
prices: First,  there are the direct effects on the consumption and welfare of household consumers;
these depend on the share of energy in total budgets and its substitutability with other fuels and with
other goods. These costs will be higher in the short run than in the long run.  Second, the indirect
effects resulting from higher revenues for utilities that permit needed investments,  allowing
producers  to become more efficient and to provide cleaner energy, both of which benefit consumers.
15/ An  important  related  issue  is that  of  sequencing  of  the various  price  adjustments.  One  factor  in determnining
appropriate  sequencing  is the  substitutability/cross  price  elasticity  of various  energy  sources  or  services.  This  is
particularly  important  in energy,  as relative  household  energy  prices  should  ideally  be  adjusted  together  to
minimize  allocative  efficiency  distortions  (i.e,  one  should  attempt  to  maintain  the  differences  between  prices
which  reflect  differences  between  economic  cost).  This  avoids  serious  mispricing  of one  fuel  relative  to  another
which  would  encourage  the  wrong  type  of  interfuel  substitution  in the  long-run.  Other  factors  affecting
sequencing  are  likely  to be  country  specific,  given  the rate  of  growth  of demand,  country  specific  cost  structure
and  overcapacity/undercapacity  conditions.22
And, third, are the macro impacts. These relate to the effects of higher prices (and reduced
subsidies) on government  expenditures  and revenues. There may also be general price level effects,
and a change in the composition  of aggregate  output. In this paper we concentrate  solely on the first
type of effect,  the direct effect on households.
Measuring welfare losses
To determine the size of the welfare losses associated  with increasing  the price of energy from their
1993 levels, we calculated  the loss in consumer  surplus as a percentage of total expenditures  based
on a range of price elasticities  from zero -- assuming no change in consumption  following  a price
rise  -- to minus one -- assuming a proportional  decline in consumption.
The welfare loss is calculated  as the loss in consumer  surplus from the price change: it is the
additional  amount of money that the consumer  pays for all of the energy that he continues  to
consume at Pl, the new higher price, (area A) plus the amount he would be willing to pay above the
old price (PO)  to consume the old quantity  (area B in figure 1).16
The change in consumer  surplus (ACS)  can be written as:
ACS  =  Qo(pl-po)(1 +  E(pj-pO)/2pO)
Where Q is quantity, p is price, f  is the price elasticity of demand, the subscript 0 refers to the
period before the price change, and the subscript 1 refers to the period after the price change. So,
the change in consumer surplus as a percentage  of the budget is:
ACS/E =  [Qo(pj-po)/E](l +  E(pj-pO)/ 2pO)
=  So[(p 1-po)/pO](1  +  E(pj-pO)/ 2pO)
where S is the budget share of energy (Q*p)/E.
This is represented  graphically  by the shaded areas A and B: the actual increase in energy
16/ Ideally we would look at the amount  of income the consumer  would  need given the new price structure  to
be as well off as he was before. That is, the amount of cash it would  take to get the consumer  on the
compensated  demand curve, but of course in practice this is very difficult to determine.p
Figure  123
outlays that takes place as a result of the price rise from P0 to P 1 (A), plus the loss in consumer
surplus as a result of the price increase and corresponding demand response in consumption (B). All
losses in consumer surplus in this paper are calculated as a percentage of total expenditures  (Areas
(A  + B)/Expenditures)).
Calculating welfare losses.  We estimated the welfare loss associated with various different
price changes (Table 8).  For illustrative purposes,  the effects on different income groups of an 80%
increase in energy prices is outlined -- an increase not deemed unrealistic  in terms of what is needed
for energy prices,  overall,  to reach "efficient" levels, as outlined in section II (Table 2).
Additional simulations are presented in Appendix tables 3 - 7 which show the welfare loss
effects of price  increases ranging from 20% to  120%. As the additional simulations show,  the
welfare loss corresponding to a zero elasticity is linear with respect to the price change, so the
welfare loss associated with a 80% price increase would be twice that associated with a 40% price
rise.  For other elasticities (less than zero) the welfare loss will increase less than proportionately in
prices because of the effect of the second term  in the equation which is squared in the price change.
That is, when demand is elastic, a price increase of 80% will be associated with less than twice the
welfare loss of a 40  % price rise.
Who hurts most?
As would be expected from looking at the share of energy consumption by various  income
groups,  the welfare loss of higher energy prices  is greater for  the non-poor than for  the poor.17
Assuming a zero elasticity of demand, the poor's  welfare declines by 5.9%,  while that of the richest
quintile declines by 8.2%  (Table 8). For all consumers taken together,  the welfare loss associated
with an 80% increase in prices is between 4.6%  and 7.6  % of their total budget, depending on the
price elasticity of demand that is assumed --the more elastic is demand, the less the welfare loss.
17/ We define  "poor", as the lowest quintile and non-poor as all those above that level.  Preliminary  results
from the poverty  assessment for Hungary indicate that the poverty headcount for Hungary is less than 20%.24
Table 8:  Effects on household  budgets of increasing  energy prices by 80%. (loss in consumer
surplus as percentage  of total expenditures).
Category  Heat  j  Electricity  Gas  J  All energy
Elasticity  0  |.5  |  0  .5  |-  |  5  |  -1  | 
I  (poorest)  1.2  1.0  .7  2.9  2.3  1.7  1.1  .8  .6  5.9  4.7  3.5
2  1.7  1.4  1.0  2.8  2.2  1.7  1.3  1.1  .8  7.2  5.7  4.3
3  2.1  1.6  1.2  2.8  2.2  1.7  1.6  1.3  1.0  8.1  6.5  4.9
4  2.1  1.6  1.2  2.6  2.0  1.5  1.7  1.4  1.0  8.6  6.9  5.2
5  (richest)  1.8  1.4  1.1  2.2  1.7  1.3  1.8  1.4  1.1  8.2  6.6  4.9
All  1.7  1 .4  1.0  2.6  2.1  1.6  1.5  1.2  .9  7.6  6.1  4.6
Source:  Authors'  simulations.
In terms of type of energy, the welfare loss to all consumers of raising electricity prices  is
much higher than for other fuels,  given its generally larger share in overall consumption.  Assuming
no change in consumption, raising power prices gives rise to a welfare loss equal to 2.6 percent of
total budgets,  compared to  1.7 percent for district heat and  1.5 percent for gas. However the impact
on the poor is especially notable. Raising power prices affects the poor more than raising the prices
of other types of energy. The poor incur welfare losses equal to 2.9 percent when power prices are
raised, compared to  1.2 percent for heat and 1.1 for gas.
In terms of socio-economic group and occupation, farmers and mixed families are hurt the
least by an overall 80% increase in the price of energy --largely because they do not consume
district heat.  Assuming a zero elasticity of demand, their welfare drops by about 5.2%,  while
pensioners  are  hurt  the most  -- 9.4%.  Workers  are  also  hurt  significantly  -- 7.1%.  These  results
suggest that the "constituency" for keeping prices low --workers and pensioners  -- is quite large in
Poland and that there may be a major political dimension to raising prices in Poland.25
Table 9:  Effects on Socio-economic  groups of increasing  energy prices by 80%
(loss in consumer  surplus as percentage  of total expenditures)
Group  Heat  Electricity  T  Gas  All energy
Elasticity  0  -. 5  -1  0  -. 5  jI  0  -. 5  0  -. 5  I
worker  2.1  1.7  13  2.4  1.9  1.4  1.5  1.2  .9  7.1  5.7  4.2
farmer  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.5  2.0  1.5  .6  .4  3  5.3  4.3  3.2
mixed  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3  1.8  1.4  1.0  .8  .6  5.1  4.1  3.1
pensioner  2.0  1.6  1.2  2.9  2.3  1.8  1.8  1.4  1.1  9.4  7.5  5.6
self-employed  1.7  1.3  1.0  2.7  2.2  1.6  2.0  1.6  1.2  7.1  5.7  4.3
soc.  recipient  1.7  1.3  1.0  3.2  2.6  1.9  1.4  1.1  .8  7.2  5.8  4.3
ource:  Authors'  jimulations.
The effects of price increases on household budgets
It is also interesting to measure the direct impact of a change in energy prices on household
budgets (as distinct from household welfare).  Table  10 shows the simulated results  for different
income groups and socioeconomic groups.  Visually, from  figure 1, the impact of the price increase
is measured as (A +  C) - (C  +  D) =  A - D.  Arithmetically,  the change in expenditure is
equivalent to SO(PI-PO/Po)[e  +  E(P 1-P 0/Po) + 11.  Table  10 indicates the increase (or decrease) in
household spending,  due to a price rise.  Where the price elasticity is -1 or greater,  the simulations
show a "positive effect" on household spending,  (i.e.  a negative change, and a reduction in
budgetary outlays) which implies that the substitution effect dominates the income effect and that
less will be spent on energy after the prices rises because of the decline in consumption.  Where the
price elasticity  is zero or -0.5,  the impact on the budget is deleterious -- in other words,  households
spend more after the price change than before.26
Table 10:  Change in actual expenditures on energy for an 80 % price increase
(percent of total expenditures)
income  Elasticity  0  |  Elasticity  -0.5  |  Elasticity  -1
group
district  electri  gas  all  disLrict  electri  gas  all  heat  electri  gas  all
heat  city  energy  heat  city  energy  city  energy
1  (poorest)  1.20  2.88  1.04  5.92  0.12  0.29  0.10  0.59  -0.96  -2.30  -0.83  474
2  1.76  2.72  1.36  7.20  0.18  0.27  0.14  0.72  -1.41  -2.18  -1.09  -5.76
3  2.08  2.80  1.60  8.16  0.21  0.28  0.16  0.82  -1.66  -2.24  -1.28  653
4  2.08  2.56  1.76  8.64  0.21  0.26  0.18  0.86  -1.66  -2.05  -1.41  -6.91
5(rlches)  1.76  2.16  2.16  8.24  0.18  0.22  0.22  0.82  -1.41  -1.73  -1.73  659
worker  2.16  2.40  1.52  7.04  0.22  0.24  0.15  0.70  -1.72  -1.92  -1.22  -5.63
farmer  0  2.56  0.56  5.36  0.00  0.26  0.06  0.54  0.00  -2.05  -0.45  -4.29
mixed  0  2.32  0.96  5.12  0.00  0.23  0.10  0.51  0.00  -1.86  -0.77  -4.10
pension  2  2.96  1.76  9.36  0.20  0.30  0.18  0.94  -1.60  -2.36  -1.41  -7.49
er
self-  1.68  2.72  2.00  7.12  0.17  0.28  0.20  0.71  -1.34  -2.18  -1.6  -5.70
employed
social  1.68  3.2  1.36  7.2  0.17  0.32  0.14  0.72  -1.34  -2.56  -1.09  -5.76
recipient
all  1.76  2.64  1.52  7.60  0.18  0.26  0.15  0.76  -1.41  -2.11  -1.22  -6.08
groupsl
Note: A positive number indicates that a larger share of total  xpenditures willbe  spent on that energy category after the
price rise than was spent before. In other words, the income effect dominates. (A negative number implies that the substitution
effect dominates and that less will be spent on energy after the prices rises because of the decline in consumption). Each entry
is calculated as (A+C)  - (C+D)  =  A-D from figure 1, the actual calculation is: change in expenditure = SO(P,-PWP[)If  +
e(P,-P,/Po) +1].27
As for effects on income groups, assuming a zero elasticity,  the largest impact of higher
energy prices over all is felt by the second-richest quintile who would see their energy outlays rise
by 8.64 percentage points from  10.8 percent of their expenditures to 19.64 percent of their
expenditures.  For the poorest quintile, the increase is 5.9 percentage points from  7.4 percent total
outlays to 13.3 percent.
Among types of  energy, the budgetary impact of higher prices is greatest for electricity.
And, the impact of raising electricity prices is hardest on the poor.
Amongst socioeconomic categories, higher energy prices affect pensioners the most,
increasing their energy expenditures by 9.3 percentage points,  from  11.7 percent to 21.0 percent of
their total spending.
Some implications: addressing the social consequences of price increases
This type of incidence/impact analysis can be used to help guide governments in determining
who is affected most,  and in determining the amount of compensation households would need, if
governments were to decide to try and offset welfare losses or financial costs to households from
price increases.  This analysis suggests if energy pricing policy is going to be used as a means to
"redistribute  income",  electricity is probably the best fuel medium. First,  increased electricity prices
hurt the poor more than increases of other energy prices.  Second, the non-poor (rich) consume
absolutely more electricity than do the poor,  so the subsidy on power benefits them, and raising
power prices would be progressive  in its impact. Explicitly subsidizing electricity prices to help the
poor however,  raises the question of interfuel substitution. If families can substitute away from other
fuel sources toward electricity,  this will have seriously distorting effects.  One way to alleviate this
problem  is by offering  lifeline pricing for a small quantity of electricity only. This option is
discussed in the next section, and its welfare effects simulated in Section V.
Although all users will lose consumer surplus if prices are increased,  their actual28
expenditures on energy may rise or fall because of the higher prices (see table 10).  If elasticities
are low, consumers  will not be able to shift consumption away from energy,  and expenditures will
increase (In figure  1, A will be larger than D).  If elasticities are high, then the substitution effect
will dominate and consumers will reduce their consumption of energy more than enough to offset
the price change (A will be smaller than D). In the short run, expenditures will probably rise as
demand may be inelastic, but in the long-run price rises should be accompanied by real energy
savings.
What the analysis does not imply
The calculations of the welfare and budgetary costs to consumers from  increasing energy
prices presented here should not be taken to suggest that increasing energy prices  would be too
"costly" to society and that efficient pricing policies should not be pursued.  On the contrary,  these
figures are presented to be a guide for the short-run welfare implications to the population,  and to
help structure the least socially costly means of implementing price increases (see section V). Also,
it should be kept in mind that the long run benefits from removing price controls are likely to far
outweigh the costs. Continuing to subsidize energy will encourage consumers to buy more energy-
intensive appliances and to over-use energy.  Thus,  if prices remain low, demand will increase,
which will in turn strain the inefficient generating plants and transmission companies whose costs
are well above prices.  Financing price subsidies has a budgetary cost and crowds out other priority
spending.  Subsidies, if too costly, will contribute to budget deficits with consequent inflationary
repercussions.
IV.  Social Pricing  Mechanisms:  A Buffer for Households?
Raising public sector prices and user charges to the appropriate levels may require  special
transitional approaches and pricing mechanisms to offset the social costs to low income households.
If well-designed,  such schemes would facilitate cost recovery by the utility and allocative efficiency
while at the same time cushioning the impact on incomes, thereby facilitating the price rise.  A29
number of approaches could be considered including: lifeline rates, vouchers,  increasing  social
assistance payments,  and general adjustments to wages and pensions." 8
"Lifeline" rates
Lifeline rates which set prices for small volumes of consumption at low levels,  and "senior
citizen rates",  which provide pensioners on fixed incomes with low-cost energy, are often used to
alleviate the social cost of raising energy prices to the low-income population. They may also help
make energy price reforms more politically palatable -- depending on what income groups represent
the constituency for low prices. Lifeline pricing is administered by the utilities which provide
discounted prices to consumers for a single "needed" block of energy while charging full price for
any consumption of excess energy over the limited lifeline block. Single (as distinct from multiple)
block pricing has the advantage of simplicity:  everyone gets to consume a certain amount of energy
at a low price.  But block rates involve "leakages", that is,  the consumption of the non-poor  is still
subsidized."9 Alternative solutions that try to target lifeline price subsidies based on means-testing
(or other targeting mechanisms) would clearly be administratively more complex.  For example, the
block rate could be given only to the "certified poor".  But this may be administratively too
complicated (it would require  identifying the eligible poor and integrating this information into the
utilities'  billing systems).  And, although it appears leakage-free,  a growing gray economy and
inadequate means-testing suggests that it is not (we have seen that household budget surveys
significantly under report income). Thus, targeted bloc rates are imperfect in a transition economy
and probably not cost effective. Finally, providing lifeline rates (unless the utility receives
compensation from the budget implies a cost to the utility that will affect the utility's  cost recovery.
Ideally,  lifeline subsidies would be compensated from the budget, and not financed internally by the
utility itself through cross-subsidies that are inefficient, unfairly tax the higher priced consumer
(usually industry) and thereby distort industrial growth and employment.
18/ Bahl and Linn 1992.
19/ To avoid this problem, the energy tariff on consumption  after the first block, could be set above the long
run marginal cost so that the average  price to consumers  of large quantities  is roughly the efficient  price.30
Multiple block rates with a "lowest" lifeline rate and a "lower" rate for the next increment
in consumption can be used to protect both poor and middle income consumers from the effects of
price increases.  They are, however,  more administratively complex than single block rates.  And
they might lead to more distortions if each group consumes electricity at different  prices,  since each
also has a different marginal rate of substitution between electricity and other goods and between
electricity and other types of energy.  If the goal is to protect the middle class,  then using a larger
single block may be more efficient than two or three blocks. This would however  involve greater
leakages, larger subsidy costs,  and less incentive to conserve.
To reduce the leakage problem and to help finance the subsidies to poor customers
consuming the first low-price bloc, rates can be raised for non-subsidized consumers or for all
customers who consume more than the first block. Lifeline rates implemented in this fashion should
thus redistribute income.  But before adopting such a scheme to redistribute income, regulators
should consider how eligible customers value the subsidies they receive;  what distortions and equity
efforts  are created,  and how the costs of lifeline pricing compare to costs of other distributive
programs  (Scott 1981). We simulate the equity effects of the lifeline pricing option, compared to
smaller,  but across the board price increases,  in section V, and find them to be more equitable.
Implementing lifeline rates in transition economies
Instituting a lifeline program -- in any country -- requires deciding: (i) the amount of
consumption (e.g.  number of kilowatt hours) to be included in initial block;  (ii) price per unit of
energy (kilowatt hour) of lifeline block and succeeding blocks; and (iii) the number of customers
who will qualify. For power, the caveats were noted above: lifeline pricing  is feasible, but has
shortcomings because of the leakages to the non-poor, and costs to the utility if lower priced power
sales are not compensated by the budget.
There are,  however,  some problems specific to the transition economies of administering a
lifeline system.  For district heating,  for example, the lack of a metering system in many transition
economies makes such a scheme quite problematic.  In most countries,  district heat is charged to the31
whole building and then attributed to households on the basis of square meters of floor space.
Although lifeline pricing of heat could be instituted by charging a lower rate per square meter for
small apartments than for larger apartments, no positive conservation incentives would be generated
and targeting based on house/or  apartment size is not likely to be efficient nor to meet equity
objectives:  there is no evidence to suggest that house size is a good proxy for income level.  (The
reverse might even be the case for,  e.g.,  pensioners who are typically poor but  "house-rich"  in the
transition  economies).  Since there is almost no housing mobility in Poland,  families cannot even
move to reduce costs and some poor families occupying large houses may be forced to pay more
when prices rise.  Another approach would be to compensate only the certified poor for a quantity
of heat that corresponds  to e.g.  20 square meters of floor space.  Here  again, since the poor cannot
adjust their consumption or limit it to the lifeline quantity, this approach would also unfairly burden
them.  On the other side,  the inelasticity of district heat demand to a change in price,  there is little
efficiency loss from a lifeline heat subsidy.  But as evidenced from the distribution of consumption
(Tables 3 and 4) it is a poorly targeted subsidy -- the rich consume more of the subsidized good as a
percentage of their income than the poor.  Consumption data also implies that lifeline pricing for
heat would also exclude some of the needy: farmers and worker-farmer  (mixed) households make up
almost 30 percent  of the very poor 20 yet they do not consume district heat and would therefore not
benefit from  the subsidy (Table 5).  Thus,  lifeline pricing makes most sense for electricity.
Vouchers
Vouchers,  which could be administered by government or local social assistance offices,
could be given to the eligible poor following price increases, entitling them to the purchase of a
certain amount of energy at a fixed price.  In principle, vouchers are more flexible than lifeline rates
in that they allow some differentiation between households based on size and composition  (the bloc
rate would apply to the "billing address" regardless of how many consumers  were present).  By
contrast,  vouchers can be given to only the poor,  assuming these can be identified. Thus the
20/ Understanding  Poverty in Poland,  p. 17.  The very poor are defined as families with income below the
minimum  pension.32
problems of a targeted lifeline program for the certified poor apply here as well.  In a growing gray
economy, means testing is harder and harder to do -- and a voucher system is clearly more
administratively cumbersome than bloc rates administered by the utility. Finally,  like lifeline rates,
targeted vouchers  interfere with allocative efficiency by impeding the response of voucher recipients
to higher prices -- i.e. they impede the operation of the substitution effect 21. If energy vouchers are
given, consumers  will use the entire voucher-eligible quantity, or will consume up to the point
where the marginal value of consumption is equal to the lower fixed (voucher-eligible) price
(assuming there is no trade in vouchers).  In addition, trade in vouchers could raise a whole new set
of issues. Selling vouchers would make them akin to cash grants for the poor  (see below),  except
that the non-poor who buy the vouchers would also benefit from the cheaper energy (although of
course they would pay for the voucher). On the positive side,  a properly designed voucher program
(that compensates the utility for each unit of underpriced energy) puts the subsidy where it belongs -
- on the budget -- and not on the financial statement of the utility.
Targeted cash payments for  the poor
Cash payments provided to the eligible poor through the social assistance system would lead
to a more efficient allocation of consumption of goods and services than vouchers,  since the poor
consumers face market prices. They also protect the utilities'  cash flows. 22 Targeted specific cash
payments could be used to increase households minimum income or given to  "at risk"  groups
through the social assistance system,  at the same time as prices move to efficient levels.  In Bulgaria,
for example, a scheme is in place to compensate poor households for higher electricity prices.
Under the Bulgarian approach, households are grouped into three categories,  by income, and a
predetermined  subsidy (transfer) is paid to each group of households; the subsidy declines, as
income goes up.  Households in the poorest group are more or less totally compensated for their
(estimated) power consumption, while better off households receive far less.  One advantage of this
21/ We have noted that the response  in transition  economies  may be muted for certain types of energy.
22/ See Milanovic (1995) for an excellent  discussion  of the pros and cons of different  types of cash and in-kind
transfers.33
scheme is that it encourages efficient consumption, since if poor households consume less than the
subsidy, then their net income is higher.
Cash payments to compensate for specific price increases to at risk groups work best if there
is an effective social assistance program already in place and the number of households in need of
assistance is small. Then they are fiscally affordable and means-testing (or otherwise targeting) is
feasible.  If large groups qualify then they may become administratively burdensome,  and fiscally
expensive.  Some countries in eastern Europe have assigned local governments responsibilities for
social welfare. Where this is the case, such as in Hungary,  Albania, and Poland,  local social
assistance offices might be reasonably well equipped for the task of distributing (but not necessarily
financing) targeted cash payments. How much compensation -- full or partial as in Bulgaria --  and
for how long 23 would all need to be decided.
Providing the cash compensation for energy price rises by increasing some guaranteed
minimum levels of income could be another approach. This would involve raising e.g.,  social
assistance payments proportionately with the increase in energy rates. As for targeted cash
payments, this would require estimating the weight of utilities in the consumer basket so that
coefficients for compensation can be found, and would require a decision about how much
compensation to offer.  While technically feasible, depending on how much compensation is offered,
and for which utilities,  this may become expensive.  (Indeed, presently,  the subsistence minimum
baskets now used to identify the poor in transition economies often exclude rents and sometimes
exclude utilities).
In-kind transfers
In principal,  transfers  in cash are more efficient than transfers  in kind, but the transfer of
"tied" social assistance is often politically more acceptable and therefore  the more attractive
23/  This could in part be related to the relative magnitudes  of the long termn  and short term price elasticities of
demand.34
alternative. (Food stamps in the U.S. are an example). (A caveat would be where this approach
could lead to the emergence of multiple in-kind transfer schemes (e.g. for transport, electricity,
heat, etc.  To that extent, a single cash transfer through  the social welfare scheme might be
administratively  simpler).
Targeted transfers in-kind  would operate as follows:  the social assistance office would first
establish  that a person/consumer  is poor.  Then, the social assistance  office would pay the
heating/power  bill directly  to the heating or utilities company. The target beneficiary  never sees the
money.  Thus, the transfer cannot be used for anything  else--it is thus analogous  to giving a given
quantity of heating to each target beneficiary  for free.  In the case of district heat in Latvia,
Milanovic  (1995) argues against blanket subsidies  and has recommended  that poor households  be
compensated  via such heat allowances  targeted to the very poor.
Such an in-kind  transfer can be calibrated  in various ways.  Milanovic  (1995) distinguishes
between two approaches: one that calibrates  the in-kind  transfer on the basis of a recipient's net (of
higher utility costs) income, or, alternatively, calibrating  the transfer on the basis of the recipient's
gross income level.  Where metering is not possible (i.e. consumption  is invariant to price), and
there are sizable differences  in utility costs across regions, the recommended  approach is to
compensate  all households  whose income  after the payment  of heating costs (i.e., income net of
utility outlay) is less than some pre-determined  poverty line.  If metering is available  and households
can change their heat consumption,  compensation  on the basis of net income may cause them to
increase heat consumption  and, thereby, increase their net income, inclusive  of subsidy. Thus, an
alternative, where metering is possible, is to compensate  all households  whose gross income is
below a certain level, for all, or some, of their utility costs.
Determining  who is eligible:  the data limitations. If the intent is only to give compensation
to "at risk" groups, this may require the development  of new information  and tracking systems.
Some observers think that effective  targeting will be relatively  easy in the transition economies
because of the large "command  and control" data base that existed in these countries.  This hope35
may be naive, however,  since these data bases were not typically designed to focus on income-
testing -- rather  they served as police files.  And, where household surveys have been undertaken,
substantial flaws appear to exist in these data bases - in Poland several million people seem to be
"off the books";  Hungary and Slovakia have important low-income ethnic groups that are similarly
elusive; consumption and income data diverge significantly.  Recent household expenditure and
income surveys show how flawed some of the data are, and how much improvement is needed. In
the  interim,  imperfect  targeting  methods  -- whether  based  on  imperfectly  measured  income  -- or
proxies for income,  may have to be used.
General wage or pension  increases
Increasing wages, pensions, unemployment benefits or other fixed incomes across-the-board
will benefit all energy consumers,  not just  the poor,  and is likely to have inflationary and budgetary
costs. Judged from the perspective of targeting, the leakages to the non-poor are disproportionately
large. However,  for major price increases, such a compensation scheme - or perhaps  a series of
lump sum payments  - may be politically necessary to compensate households for the impact on
incomes. On the positive side, this approach allows the price mechanism to work, and does not
interfere with the finances of the utility.  In Albania, increases in  wages, pensions, unemployment
benefits,  and welfare payments were used to compensate households for 75  % of the increase in
power  tariffs in 1994.  The main issue associated with wage increases would be the possible,  and in
the transition  economies probable,  wage-price spirals that may be generated by wage compensation
for price  increases.  "Political economy" aspects make such restitution particularly dangerous  in the
transition economies.  Given the socialist legacy of entitlement, this approach could establish a
perceived entitlement to general compensation for price increases (as distinct from targeted
compensation to at risk groups), and may set unwise precedents.  Any compensation should therefore
take a one-time-only form and be targeted to at-risk groups.
The preferred approaches
Cash payments to at risk groups are probably the preferred  compensation scheme. They are36
targeted,  fiscally narrow,  allocatively efficient, and,  since they are financed by the budget they are
not financially harmful to the utilities. Whatever the approach, the choice should be based on the
current  social assistance system and on future social assistance policies,  and should be coordinated
with energy sector objectives. A lifeline rate with a single block may be preferable if social
assistance targeting is sufficiently weak. And, it could be phased out over time--perhaps by
shrinking the block. It must be kept in mind that the need for social assistance in turn is affected by
the method of price  compensation chosen. If targeting through subsidized energy pricing is
introduced,  then this should be factored into the level of social assistance. If prices are allowed to
rise to market prices for everyone then some form of compensation through  social assistance should
be implemented to offset these high costs for the poor.
The political  economy of price increases
In the end,  however, the political economy dimension may dominate: often it is not  "the
poor" who are government's  concern, but the broad middle. In this case, some broad-based
income\wage compensation scheme may be the instrument of (political) choice: ideally it would
offer  (very) partial compensation (i.e. wages would rise by less than the amount of the price rise,
weighted by energy's  budget share); and perhaps for the first year(s),  income tax brackets would not
be adjusted,  so as to  "claw back"  some of the gains.  Alternatively,  the indexation applied could be
progressive,  compensating higher income groups for a smaller proportion of the price rise than
lower  income groups.
V.  Implications for Pricing Policy
From the analysis  of sections III and IV, it appears that if pricing policy going to be used as
a means to redistribute  income (although we do not advocate price policy as a redistributive tool),
electricity is probably the best vehicle compared to other energy sources.  Increased electricity prices
hurt the poor more than increases of other energy prices. But the non-poor consume much more
electricity than do the poor,  so that raising prices would be progressive  in its impact. And,
subsidizing electricity prices -- as distinct from targeted cash payments -- raises the question of37
interfuel substitution. If families can substitute away from other fuel sources toward electricity this
will have serious distortionary  effects. One way to mitigate both problems is by offering  lifeline
pricing for a small quantity of electricity only.
Welfare analysis of lifeline pricing
Lifeline pricing creates a supply curve that is horizontal at a low price for the initial block of
subsidized energy, then jumps to the "correct" economic price for all additional consumption (see
figure 2).  Here we assume that the price is not increased for the block of energy that is subsidized,
but for all energy above the block consumers pay the true price. The loss in consumer surplus due
to the price change will now be the additional amount consumers pay for energy that is consumed
over the first block (area A) plus the loss due to changed consumption resulting from the higher
price (area B). It will be the same as before 24,  less the value of the first block (area C),  for which
no welfare is lost.  If the consumer uses more than the first block after lifeline pricing is
implemented, then the loss, ACS (the shaded area in figure 2), will be:
ACS =  QO(P*-PB)(1 +  e(p*  PB)/ 2pB)-QB(p*  PB)
Where Q is quantity, p is price,  e is the price elasticity of demand, the subscript 0 refers to the
initial period,  the subscript B refers to the block of subsidized energy, and the superscript  * refers  to
the efficient price and quantity.  So, the change in consumer surplus as a percentage of the budget is:
ACS/E =  (SO(P*-PB)/PB)(1  +  E(p* PB)/ 2PB) SB(P*-PB)/PB
Where S. is the share of energy at the price PB  and SB is the share of budget share of the subsidized
block of energy also at price PB.
If the consumer chooses to consume exactly the first block after lifeline pricing is
implemented then he will suffer a small welfare loss (figure 3). That is, if the demand curve crosses
supply where the supply curve is vertical,  then the consumer loses the surplus from the additional
electricity he would have consumed had the price remained low. He consumes exactly the first block
24/ Recall that the loss in consumer  surplus, as calculated  previously,  was the area between the demand  curve
and the vertical axis, and above the old price and below the new price.az  *  m
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of electricity and loses the shaded triangle in figure 3. In this case the change in consumer surplus
will be:
ACS  =  (QO-QB)(P  -PB)/2)
iACS/E  =  (QO-QB)(P**PB)/2E
Where p** is the price the consumer would be willing to pay to consume the lifeline block of
energy. 25 Clearly,  if he consumes below the cutoff QB both before and after lifeline pricing is
implemented, his loss will be zero.
To estimate the impact of lifeline pricing on different income groups we examined the case
of a single block of electricity and used demand information from the household budget survey with
a range of reasonable price elasticities. The June,  1993 price of electricity was ZI 864 kwh. We
assumed that the lifeline rate for the first block remains unchanged at  ZL 864 kwh, and an 80
percent price increase is implemented for any additional consumption (table 11). We estimated the
loss in consumer surplus for a bock of  100 kwh per household and 50 kilowatt hours per household,
per month.
Empirical results: lifeline pricing
Although this is only illustrative exercise,  it shows that some targeting can be achieved by
offering a small block of cheaper electricity to consumers.  There still are several problems however.
For one thing,  lifeline blocks can not be offered on a per-capita basis, which weakens their targeting
power.  Poor families tend to be larger than the non poor--the average household size of households
with income below the poverty line is 4.27 persons, while those above the poverty line have an
average size of 3 people. And, lifeline pricing is unlikely to be the most cost effective way of
helping the poor consume energy:  there is still leakage to the non-poor.
If raising prices to efficient levels for all consumers is not politically feasible at present,  the
evidence suggests that it may be socially better to use lifeline pricing and a large price  increase than
25/ Note that, p** - PB =  PB(QB  QO)/QOc-39
an overall, but smaller price increase. Note that lifeline pricing for electricity in combination with
an 80% price increase has better distributional effects than an across the board price rise for
electricity.  While both a 50 percent overall price increase and an 80 percent price increase in
combination with a 100 kwh lifeline block result in approximately the same gross revenues to the
utility (assuming a zero elasticity and hence no change in consumption), lifeline pricing is easier on
the poor than on the non-poor,  while increasing prices across the board is actually harder on the
poor than on the non-poor (this remains true for all the values of elasticity chosen).  Figure 4 shows
the welfare loss as a function of expenditure category under the alternative pricing regimes:  lifeline
pricing results  in a burden that is roughly increasing with income, while an overall price increase is
associated with a decreasing burden across expenditure groups.  Under lifeline pricing the poorest
group loses 1.4 percent of their budget while the richest groups lose 1.7 percent.  A smaller but
across-the-board price  increase of 50 percent implies a welfare loss for the poorest quintile of 1.8
percent,  and for the richest only  1.4 percent.  The distributional effect is reduced, but still quite
evident when the block is smaller.  A block of 50 kwh in combination with an 80% price increase
for additional consumption hits all consumers with approximately the same welfare loss of about 2.1
percent as a percent of their respective budgets assuming a zero elasticity (table 1), while an across
the board  increase in the price of electricity hits the poor harder (see appendix tables 3-7).
Figure  4 Welfare  Loss  as a percent  of  the budget--
100  kwh  lifeline  pricing  and  80% price  increase  vs.  50% price
increase
(price  elasticity  of  demand  0)
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Table 11: Welfare Loss of 100 kwh and 50 kwh monthly lifeline blocs with 80 percent price
increase for consumption above the lifeline (as a percentage of total expenditures)
Expenditure  Amount  Quantity per  Household  Block  Welfare  loss  (percent  of budget)
group  spent on  capita*  size  per capita
electricity  (lOOkwh/hh  size)  E = O  e = -.5  E=  _26  l
(1,000 zl)*  (50kwh/hh size)
I  (poorest)  42.13  48.77  4.03  24.81  1.4  0.8  0.4
12.41  2.1  1.6  1.0
2  59.22  68.54  3.41  29.32  1.6  1.0  0.6
14.66  2.2  1.6  1.1
3  75.40  87.27  3.04  32.89  1.8  1.2  0.7
16.45  2.3  1.7  1.2
4  88.65  102.61  2.72  36.76  1.7  1.1  0.7
18.38  2.1  1.5  1.0
5  (richest)  117.67  136.20  2.47  40.48  1.6  1.1  0.6
20.24  1.9  1.4  1.0
all  76.62  88.68  3.13  31.94  1.7  1.2  0.6
15.97  2.2  1.7  1.2
From household budget survey. Source: Authors'osimulatnons.  Assumes  pice  ncrease for non-lme  oc.
Some advantages and disadvantages of lifeline rates
There are a few other caveats on lifeline pricing.  It is important that the lifeline block
remains small. Lifeline subsidies may not be the best way to subsidize energy if the value of
the subsidy to consumers  is less than the cost of providing the subsidy.  The value of the
26/ Note that in some cases the consumption will be reduced to exactly the block. For these cases the method
corresponding  to figure 3 was used to calculate the welfare loss.41
subsidy to the consumer is the amount of money that the consumer would be willing to pay
for the subsidy. For consumers using less than the subsidized block the value of electricity at
the margin is its subsidized price and the value of the subsidy is therefore  zero. For these
consumers waste arises since the cost of the subsidy exceeds their value of it. There is no
waste for consumers who use more than the first block, since they value the subsidized
energy above its cost.  Larger lifeline price reductions result in more waste as a percentage of
the total subsidy (since more consumers fall inside the subsidized block) and smaller blocks
create less waste (Scott 1981)27.  Additionally, a large lifeline block, though it may be an
appealing way of meeting the needs of the poor and the middle class, could be costly to
implement. Take our example above, a 50 kwh monthly lifeline block would cost the utilities
about Zl 34,560 per household per month in foregone revenue (as compared to an 80% price
increase of all consumption and assuming a zero elasticity),  and a 100 kwh block would cost
twice that amount. A block designed to meet the needs of the median consumer (about 250
kwh) would cost the power company about Zl 170,000 (just under $10 at 1993 exchange
rates) per household per month.
If the purpose of lifeline pricing is to redistribute income, to effectively achieve this
objective, subsidies must be significant. As the amount of assistance by way of pricing policy
increases, however,  so too does the loss in terms of waste.  Scott 1981, finds that this
tradeoff between equitability and efficiency does not favor lifeline pricing as a way to help
the poor.  "Subsidized rates for electricity.  . . do not seem to be the most efficient means of
raising  real  income  of the  poor,  the  elderly  , or  the disabled.  . . Only an  extensive  lifeline
program  can have even a noticeable effect on the living standards of recipients. The waste to
recipients of such a program, however,  would be substantial."  (Scott pp. 543).  Nonetheless,
in an environment where other approaches are difficult due to inability to target,  or
administratively weak social welfare systems, as in the transition economies, lifeline pricing
may remain the best option.
27/  To estimate  the value of various types of subsidies  to those who consume less than the full block, the shape
of the demand curve must be known.  Scott  assumes  that consumers  have cobb-douglass  utility -- i.e. price
elasticity and income elasticity of demand for electricity  are equal to one in absolute  value.42
Conclusions
This paper looks at the welfare effects of increasing energy prices. Our main finding' -
- not too surprising  -- is that  the policy  of subsidizing  energy  prices,  common  in the
transition economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,  is regressive. While
such programs  do help the poor in providing them with lower cost energy, they are more
useful to the rich who consume more energy. What is surprising is the extent to  which the
non-poor have benefited from lower energy prices; not only do the wealthy consume more
energy than the poor,  they spend a larger portion of their income on energy as well.
Based on this analysis, we are able to rule out the oft-used social welfare argument
for delaying energy price increases,  though we make no attempt to answer the broader
question of what the dynamically efficient pricing path should be. Better targeting than is
attained through energy subsidies can be achieved directly through a social assistance
program.  If some relief is desired for all consumers during the transition,  while incomes are
low,  lifeline pricing for  a small block of electricity, accompanied by significant price
increases,  is feasible,  and simulations show this approach may be more equitable than
raising prices across the board, but more slowly, for  all consumers.  Ideally the public utility
would be compensated for reduced price sales from the budget, rather than having to finance
it by internal cross-subsidies.
Associated with the energy sector in the transition economies today are a host of
inefficiencies: allocative, productive,  dynamic, and financial. Here we have tackled the
allocative effectiveness of pricing policy and found that subsidizing household energy
consumption does not help to redistribute income efficiently. Moreover,  price controls lead to
significant inefficiencies on the production side that are likely to have a heavy cost over time.
What is still needed--and remains under much debate is a more general framework to
evaluate the tradeoffs and costs to society of taking a big bang approach or taking a gradual
approach to adjustment of  the energy sector prices.43
Appendix
Table  1: Electricity  Pricing  in  1994
US cents/kWh
(percent  of conventionally  estimated  LRMC  cost in  parenthesis)
Ratio
Country  Industrial  Residential  Residential
Industrial
Hungary  5.2  5.5  1.0
(130%)  (70-80%)
Poland  3.7  5.1  1.4
(60-70%)  (50-60%)
Albania  4-4.5  5.4  1.25
(90-100%)  (70-80%)
Czech Republic  5.6  2.7  0.5
(95-110%)  (30-40%)
Slovakia  4.6-5.5  2.7  0.6
(100-110%)  (40%)
Bulgaria  2.4  0.75  0.3
(60-70%)  (10-15%)
Russia  2.7  0.6  0.22
(75-90%)  (10-15%)
Ukraine  1.4  0.34  0.25
(40-60%)  (4-10%)
OECD Average  7.4  14.0  1.9
Turkey  10.0  10.1  1.044
Appendix
Table  2: Natural  Gas Pricing  1994
US cents/cubic  meter
(percent of estimated economic cost in parenthesis)
I  ~~~~~~~Ratio
Country  Industrial  Residential  Residential
Hungary  28  24  0.86
(112%)  (80%)
Poland  12  17  1.4
(90-110%)  (60-70%)
Slovakia  12  10-15  0.8-1.2
(90-110%)  (50-65%)
ource:  World Bank and IEA45
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Table 3: Welfare loss from a 20% price increase
Category  Heat  Electricity  Gas  Energy
Elasticity  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1
1 (poorest)  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.2  1.5  1.4  1.3
2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.8  1.7  1.6
3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.4  2.0  1.9  1.8
4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.4  2.2  2.0  1.9
5 (richest)  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  2.1  1.9  1.8
All  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.3  1.9  1.8  1.7
Table 4: Welfare loss from a 40% price increase
Category  Heat  Electricity  Gas  Energy
Elasticity  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1
1 (poorest)  0.6  0.5  0.5  1.4  1.3  1.1  0.5  0.5  0.4  2.9  2.7  2.4
2  0.9  0.8  0.7  1.4  1.2  1.1  0.7  0.6  0.5  3.6  3.2  2.9
3  1.0  0.9  0.8  1.4  1.2  1.1  0.8  0.7  4.1  3.7  3.2
4  1.0  0.9  0.8  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.7  4.3  3.9  3.5
5 (richest)  0.9  0.8  0.7  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  4.1  3.7  3.3
All  0.9  0.8  0.7  1.3  1.2 1.1 0.8  0.7  0.6  3.8  3.4  3.046
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Table 5: Welfare loss from a 60% price increase
Category  Heat  Electricity  Gas  Energy
Elasticity  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1
1 (poorest)  0.9  0.8  0.6  2.1  1.8  1.5  0.8  0.7  0.6  4.4  3.8  3.1
2  1.3  1.1  0.9  2.1  1.8  1.4  1.0  0.9  0.7  5.4  4.6  3.8
3  1.5  1.3  1.1  2.1  1.8  1.5  1.2  1.0  0.8  6.1  5.2  4.3
4  1.5  1.3  1.1  1.9  1.6  1.3  1.3  1.1  0.9  6.5  5.5  4.5
5 (richest)  1.3  1.1  0.9  1.6  1.4  1.1  0.1  1.1  0.9  6.2  5.2  4.3
All  1.3  1.1  0.9  2.0  1.7  1.4  1.1  1.0  0.8  5.7  4.9  4.0
Table 6: Welfare loss from a 100% price increase
Category  Heat  Electricity  Gas  Energy
Elasticity  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1
1 (poorest)  1.5  1.1  0.7  3.6  2.7  1.8  1.3  1.0  0.7  7.4  5.5  3.7
2  2.2  1.6  1.1  3.4  2.6  1.7  1.7  1.3  0.8  9.0  6.7  4.5
3  2.6  1.9  1.3  3.5  2.6  1.7  2.0  1.5  1.0  10.2  7.6  5.1
4  2.6  1.9  1.3  3.2  2.4  1.6  2.2  1.6  1.1  10.8  8.1  5.4
5  (richest)  2.2  1.7  1.1  2.7  2.0  1.4  2.2  1.7  1.1  10.3  7.7  5.1
All  2.2  1.7  1.1  3.3  2.5  1.7  1.9  1.4  1.0  9.5  7.1  4.847
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Table  7: Welfare  loss from  a 120% price  increase
Category  Heat  Electricity  Gas  Energy
Elasticity  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -.5  -1  0  -. 5  -1
1 (poorest)  1.8  1.3  0.7  4.3  3.0  1.7  1.6  1.1  0.6  8.8  6.2  3.5
2  2.6  1.8  1.0  4.1  2.9  1.7  2.0  1.4  0.8  10.8  7.5  4.3
3  3.1  2.2  1.2  4.2  2.9  1.7  2.4  1.6  1.0  12.2  8.6  4.9
4  3.1  2.2  1.2  3.8  2.7  1.5  2.6  1.8  1.0  12.9  9.1  5.2
5 (richest)  2.6  1.9  1.1  3.3  2.3  1.3  2.7  1.9  1.1  12.3  8.6  4.9
All  2.6  1.8  1.1  4.0  2.8  1.6  2.3  1.6  0.9  11.4  8.0  4.648
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